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TRE: Pm-AFRlClN POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF SOEP1?31 
AFRICA, 1945-1970: AN IUTRODUCTORY 013~LfrnE(~)  
A,lthou& the policies p-tmsued by the vasioua governments of South 
Africa since World W a r  31 differed from each other, there was 
conside~able continuity and the objectives pmued pemained, f o r  
most of the period, the same; so -there is definitely a sense in 
which these policies cam be re&ed as stages in the development 
of a single, averall pol9cy. 
The main a i m s  of policy were conceived before the 
p o l i t i c a l  c-a which decolonization Mtiated .h Africa. The 
San-African policy, therefore, presupposed the continuation of the 
imperid p o l i t i c a l  oslaer in Africa more or less as it had been in 
1945-46, and even when heependence came the residual influence of 
the fomer colonial powere remained important f o r  South African 
Africa policies. Although modifications of the policy were forced 
upon the South African governments, the basic aim remained what it 
had always been: t o  establish in Africa a p o l i t i c d  context (2) 
ideologically and organisationallg favourable to a t e  minority 
r u l e  in South Africa, l'to preserve Africa f o r  M t e  Christian 
civilizationt\ or, another way of putting the same W, white 
domination. 
While this basic of the Africa policy wa8 merely 
expressive of the structure of the soc i eb  and pol i ty  of South 
Africa itself, and its historical relatiomhlp with the rest of the 
international wstem, the development of the Africa policy, i . e .  
its cmmlative, ~rectional change, was the product of the dynamic 
intera-ction between South Afr ica  tlpan-Afric&smqt and oppos it ional 
forces ia Africa and elsewhem. The development of the ideology of 
black pan-Africaniam in the poabwaz world alongside the diffusion 
within the international system of an egalitazian, multi-racial 
ethic ewndered. a conflict a i k t i o n  rin the Africa-South Africa 
relationship. 
The conflict pmcesses involved hcluded the cleaser 
definition of e a l s  asld the search for optimum stmtegies.  This 
jn-volved f&e creation of new instnmtentalities f o r  the 
implementation of pol icy (and the expansion and modif Lcation of 
existing ones), and the mobilization (and f b n c t i o d  integration) 
of latently policy-supportive extm-go~emmental gmups: e.g. some 
uniersity d e p h e n t s ,  businessmen and business organizations. 
The present paper attempts an exposition of the Africa 
policies, ex a t e ,  of the w i o w  Union and Republican govemmenta; 
terminally, an attempt is made to describe the kind. of theoretical 
framework- which might; profitably. be employed to comprehend the 
development of the Pm-African policy. 
I 
me Africa Policy of huts (3)  
buts' post-was tern as prime minister was brief, but it 
fomed a backpound against wkdch succeeding governments shaped 
their own policies. Smu.tsr Africa policy was conditioned by the 
political outlook which he had developed over long yeam in 
political office, and embodied the distinctive elements of that 
outlook. Thw, for example, Smuts hoped to achieve his ajms in 
Africa by close collaboration with the British mire ancl 
Commonwealth and by making generous concessions to the British 
settler communities north of South Africa, 
Ever since the days of the Botha @verrrment Smuts had 
believed h the "round.bg off" of South Africafa territory by 
incorporation or annexation of neighbour* territories. la 1946 
he restated these sen-hhents as hav- been the basis of his whole 
policy $hen he said: 
"... the whole of my s t r i v h g  has been 
t o  ensure the hi t t ing  together of the 
parts of Africa, the parts of Southern 
Africa which belong to each other; 
p&s that must k r k  together f o r  a 
stable future on the continent of 
Africa." (4) 
The existence of a common, ovemJ.1 p o l i t i c d  system fox 
all. these temitories would have facilitated the achievement of 
this rounding off.  So far as: British territories were concerned, 
they cwrmonly belonged to the R q i r e  and Commonwealth, but ifs 
composition in 1945, or at time f o r  t ha t  makter, did  not provide 
an organiza+ional. framework for unified control and mvemment of 
the temitoxias of southern and cent& Africa. Smuta therefore 
hoped that at the end of the waz the British mire mula be 
reorgatLized into reg5onal -ups with more power to the re@ons, 
although strong l U s  woruld mmin between the regions and the 
centre. (5) Southern Africa would constitute one such region. 
What tvSouthern Africa" would comprise was not quite clear: it 
m i & t  extend as far as Keqa, but it would certainly islclude 
Sou-them Rhodesia, South West Afsica, the Hi& C o d s s i o n  
Territories, and the Union. 
Beyond +hem notions Smutsf pol9cy towards Africa was 
vague. PEW, he saw Westem Eumpe as having a civilising mission 
in Africa and thou@ of Africa as politically an extension of 
Europe. North o f  the %bra his policy mi&t be expected t o  be 
dictated by the plans of the  mire and Cormnonve2dLth, as f t had 
been during the w a r  - that area not being a specific preoccupation 
of the  Union Mvemmnt m such, but of the Union Government as 
park a£ the British imperial system, of which Smuts greatly 
approved. 
The greatest setback for Smts' policy was, of course, 
-the fact that in South Africa itself there were v e q  
questions azising f r o m  the British connection which were not 
solved: such, for example, was the language question, which had 
been one of the reasons why Southern Rhoaesian whites had voted 
againat incorporation in 1923. The 1- issue was on ly  p& of 
the often acrimonious pol i t ica l  competition between Afrihner 
nationalists ayld the pm-British elements headed by Smts, a factor 
which may have affected Southem Rhodesian attitudes. ( 6 )  
hcreashg ly ,  after the initial failure, Afrikmer nationalism 
became, for responslPbLe British and Colonial authorities, a major 
dieincentive t o  a union of the sort Smuts hoped for .  (7) Besides, 
British guvermnents and administrators had long been developing 
policies and implementing -hem h these territories, and there were 
local. matters of govel~ment which could not d w q s  be, and certainly 
were not after the l92Os, made t o  wait for the gmnd reorganization 
of the British African mire, The wsolutionff of ?Aese problems in 
the Rhodesias tended less and less to be orbnted towads  the 
south. 
Ia addition t o  all these factors  there ww the * 
apprehension alr~ays felt in the Colonial and Dominions Offices 
about the native p o l i c i e s  of white settlers and f ie  disappmval of 
the Unioafs native policies, symbolized by the Britjsh refusal to 
band over the High Commission Territories to South Africa. The 
t'EJative Questionf9more than amythhg else would, even if the plans 
had become otherwise practicable, have created enormous difficulties 
fo r  the realization of Smuts' plans, though one supposes that those 
difficulties need not have been decisive. (8) In the event, 
however, the Smuts p l w  never redly n e m d  implementation, and 
there is reason to believe that Smuts was sensitive to the 
difficulties over native policy anit would not have pressed the 
impexid government on a matter on which it could not y i e ld .  After 
1945, Smuts himself would probably not he f a v o m d  the opening up 
of the question of native policy which m precipitate d d  or 
agitation far colonial reorganization m d d  have necessitated. 
Besides, he was under severe criticism f r o m  Afrikanex nationalists 
f o r  allegedy conspiring to create a Mir State merely to  thwart 
their republican aspirations. ( 9 )  
fb the last three gears of M s  premiership Smuts 
restricted his African d,iplomacy to the  co-ordination of services 
between South Africa and British territories, leaving ihe guestion 
of p o l i t i c d  CO-opem+ion out of the reckoning f o r  the while, 
al thoqb there were loud voices in favour of it in Rhodesia. (10) 
At my m t e ,  so soon after the wax there were more urgent tasks f o r  
imperial sta+,emanship. Previous experience, too, had shown t ha t  
the idea af uniting: territories should be approached with great 
circumepaction. 
With respect to South West Africa, the same Ufficulties 
did nof arise. b the uncerh.inties created by the W s e  of %he 
League of Nations, Smut8 c d d  take advanfage of the collapse of the 
German Eapire (11) t o  seek internationd. sanction f o r  the 
incorpoPation of South West Africa in the Union. British support fox 
Smu-t;st plea for incorporation was perbps explicable by t h e  very good 
relat ions between B r i t a i n  and South A f r i c a  at the time. AJ.80, while 
all sorts of problems might wise with the transfer of colonies 
where B r i t a i n  was exercising the functions of tm-beeshjp", the 
South West Africa queation was one of f o r e i p  policy and was perlmps 
not considered to be subject to the aortsof conditions atten- the 
transfer of colonies. It was not a "territory in which British Pule 
had definitely been establishedgf - h the language of earlier 
British colonial diplomacy. 
Smuts obtained Brltiah support for  the incorporation of 
South Weat Urica, ?mt b i a  requerst was turned down by the United 
.Nations. 
When Smuts went in 1940, after an electoral defeat, his 
Africa policy had failed f o x  it depended on the special relationship ' 
between South Africa and the British mire and Commonwealth, which, 
among other things, Afrikaner nationalists had, by implication at 
least, asked the white South African electorate 50 reject. 
Wan and Wze African Charter 
The golfcy t o m  Africa w h i c h  man pursued differed 
f r o m  Smutsl in important r e m e c t ~ .  a t h o w  Man hoped to use the 
Comonwedth comection t o  achieve his aim8 in Africa (123, he had 
no t h e  for * e  p o l i t i c d  unification of British territories. He 
had long expressed his disapproval, as a nat ional is t ,  of being 
imprisoned in the British imperial. M. 
Wan d s o  ttobjeetedw to the imperialist politfcs which 
Wts seemed to repmsent, and had. r e m e d  the Treaty of Versailles 
(which mve South Africa the South West Africa mandate) aa a Weaky 
of Wmng (h Traktaat van Onreg). (13) Yet, with Ge- out of +he 
way and im the  face of opposition t e  South Afxicats policies,  
Nalan.changed his position after the w x  and favoured the armexatfon 
of South West Africa. A g a i n s t  critics of his govemmentfs policies 
in South West Africa, he later complained that they violated South 
Africa' S ri&ts under the Treatg of Vemailles (albeit In tdtaat 
van o m q )  ! (14) By the South West Africa Representation Act of 
1949 he took -the first step towards incorporation, in defiance of 
the U.N. 
Like Smuts, he believed isr the white mission civilatrice 
in Africa - a heavenly mandate, to be fulfilled whether Africans 
liked it or not - but his attitude was more openly racialist. Re 
sought t o  make Africa secwe f o ~  llwhite Christian civilization" by 
keeping power firmly in white hands (151, and he much regretted the 
speed of developments in West Africa where K m e  NkrumEhh was made 
Leader of GovenzmellZl Business in *he Geld Coast. (163 As the 
movement towards decolonization @thered pace, malazz reflected: 
tt'Phere will have to be a psycholog5cd 
revolution. One f inds  in the  world 
today, and especially in ~ l ~ ,  that  
there is a sickly sentimentality in 
re@ to the black m. Someone 3n 
authority told me i31 -land ... that 
one can say with truth that they 
venerate a black skin. The position 
i~3 that under these circumsta;nces I 
fear that the people of Europe, the 
white nations of Eumpe, axe becoming 
decadent. (17) 
Wan hoped to persuade a e  Ebmpean powers with 
posee~~aiens itr Africa t o  strengthen the position of the white man 
by excluding from Africa aJ.1 bians and c o ~ s t s .  This, he 
claimed, would be in the interests of the blacks as well. (18) 
Ib addition t o  the aims already stated, Milan hoped to 
prevent -the of natives and. their use in Eumpean wars, to 
prevent them f r o m  be* a danger t o  themselves and t o  o-bher nations 
in Africa. (191 For the purposes of his lVAfxican Charterv, Wan 
divided Africa in to  two p h s :  Africa south of the Sahara, which 
w a ~  ttunde~elopedtf and where the notion of the civilising mission 
had particular relevance, ancl where as f a  as possible he s o w t  t o  
achieve unity of purpose among the powers and to m o n i z e  their 
native policies; the rest, North m i c a ,  was imqo-sl;a;nt as the 
" g a t e ~  t o  Africaw and should therefore be protected @a-L -the 
commwri~t per i l .  (20) 
Like Smts and his followem, M a n  and his supporters 
conceived of South Africa as the &ant of Africa and wished f o r  it 
a role of importance h African affairs. The Zdea t h a t  South 
Afxica would  be very important im a fu- waz because of i ts 
geographical posiiion, and that, because of  itsj iadwtrial powes, 
it would be the workshop of the West h a futme European W-, was 
a widely held belief among Afrikaner nationalists at the time. 
The increase in the Union*a African trade which the wax 
had br0-t about encouraged the belief that .the African market 
was of great importance f o r  the Union's developing: industries. 
Accordhgly, it was generally w e e d  by most w h i t e  opinion leaders 
that the African market should be nursed. (21) As A.fxica*a 
industrial giant, the  Union would export manufactures in exchange 
f a r  raw materials from the rest of Africa. (22) 
h practice, the African Charter would be implemented by 
the c r e a t i o n  of aa orgmizationd fmmework for consultation and 
co-operation among the powem. (23) Thus Wan gave diligent support 
to such scientific and tecWcaJ. organiza-tions as the C.C.T.A. and 
the C. S.A. (and their various subordinate organizations), while the 
defence of Rf~ ica  would be secured by means o f  a fiefence o r m z a t i o n  
d o g o u p ,  t o  NATO and SPATO - an idea which f a i l ed  t o  &n support 
outside South Africa, Wanvs defence minister, W. Emsmua, having 
to content hhse l f  with the then much less rneahgful Simonstown 
Agreement, (2 4) 
The Union Government fai led t o  @a agreement on the 
banning of dfxican~ from &Litmy training, tkie South African Minister 
o f  Economic Affairs, as thou& by studied demonstration, being 
provided with a %ativetf guard of honour d w h g  his visit to the 
B e l g i a n  C o w .  (25) 
The Union Goverment,traditiondly nationalist and 
republican, found i t s e l f  advocating inrpexialism in Africa and eager 
to exclude all anti-imperidiats. Of theae, the U.N. was among the 
worst culprits, fo r  it was the o r m z a t i o d  expression at the 
=&eat level of those aspects of articulate world opinion t o  which 
Malan so objected. It was interfering ''directly and indirectlyn 
"by simply regadhg a l l  people as 
equal and all nations,  whether they 
are r ipe  for it or not, must have 
certain humam rights, as they call 
it, including the fmnchise ... 
That is one has this unrest in 
Africa .., because people were 
bmught under the impression by UN0 
that they were oppressedn. (26) 
While seeking British co-operation in hplementhg his 
Africa policy, Wan was concerned t o  reduce British influence in 
southern Africa, in fulfilment of his n a t i o n d i s t  obligations but 
a lso  t o  ensure that similaz native policies were pursued in the 
territories which were 80 clorje t o  South Africa. He argued with 
vigomus rhetoric for the tmsfir of -the H i &  C o d s s i o n  
territories becauae of the condemnation of South African m e  
policfea which the refusal. implied (271, but perhaps also to 
impress Afrikamx m t i o n d i s t s  who were worried by, what seemed to 
them, his hesitancy on the question of the republic. (28) 
The MxIcan Charter was never adopted by +he imperial 
powers, and when W a r n f a  tern ended the trend of ervents in Africa 
was contrary to what he had wiehed. The question of m e  relations 
had been fundamental 50 Wants Africa policy, but the mcial 
pract ices  of the Union Government were, fo r  man as f o r  Smuts, a 
disabl* fac tor  in  theis attempts t o  influence policy in Africa. 
k the Stxijdom go~emene which succeeded Mants, Eric 
Louw was given the por t fo l io  of e x t e d  affairs. L i k e  Strijdom, he 
r~as a lawyer. Louw &so had long experience in interaatioml 
affairs d, having been economics minister in the previous 
government, he took p d i c u l a s  interest in the Unlonls trade with 
Africa. As minister of e x t e d  affajrs Louw took @eat interest in 
the Africa policy. He had. himself visited a numbex of African 
territories Fn 1949. On assuming office he reox+sed the externd. 
affairs deparkent and developed its Rfxican section. Ib the same 
sp i r i t  he took conaiderable intereat and pride in the role South 
Africa was playing b u &  the C.C.T.A., the C.S.A. and F.A.M.A., 
in the affairg of the contbent. (29) 
Strijidm, f o r  his p w t ,  was regaxded by most as an 
extremist republican and waa completely @at a a o f t  native 
policy. He it was urho championed the white baasskap element in, 
Afxikaner nationalism. 
&ic Louw's term at the W s t r g  of Mernal Affairs 
coincided with the mpid changes bm*t about by decolonization, 
and the eazlier idea of leadership in Africa W c h  had been p& of 
both Smuts-d Wants vision mve no cleaz mandate in the rapidly 
changing conditions. South African politicians cd led  f o r  more 
leadership by the Union Govemrment in Africa, but it w a ~  unclear 
what th is  should mean beyond a few attempts to expand trade here 
aJld open a nission there. 
Strijdomb rrepublicanis~ was tending, too, to isolate 
South Africa from the res t  of British Africa, d the anti- 
afrikaner sentiments which H u g g i n s  had earlier exhibited were 
given a new relevance. mere no doubt, in the eaxly years of 
Strijdomts ministry at least, that the South Africa Government and 
the Bedemtion Government and B r i t &  took the3.s differences on 
native policy seriously. Afrikaner na-bionalista were therefore glad 
about tbe setback t o  '$aztnershiptr which the Ra;fue electoral result 
of 1955 represented, Die Bmmr calling f t "a scandal in a e  
familyvf - the B r i t i ~ h  family. Hopes were somewhat revived *bat 
South Africa could st i l l  obtain co-operation and solidari* among 
whites - at least in southerm Africa. (30) 
h keeping with the African Charter, Louw was d e t e d e d  
to c o d e r a c t  what  he called Xndiarz, infiltration fn Africa, 
d e c i d b g  to reopen the South African c o n d a t e  in Mada@scar, which 
had eazlier been closed beczause there me not eno@ work, in order 
to counter k d i a n  ffactivityy+ehere. (31) 
AB fas as defence was concerned, the Union Government 
s t i l l  hoped to achieve an African defence alliance, dtho* it 
soon became apparent that neither this nor the ban on lqnativerl 
d e s  could be achieved. Defence, however, obsessed the defence 
a s t e r  at this time, p d i c u l a z l y  on account of the 
developments in missiles perhaps, so that between 1955 and 1957 he 
pursued his allimce policy w i t h  considerable diligence. 
The creation o f  self-go~embg and, later, independent 
black states in Africa cal led f o r  a sesponse f r o m  the Union 
hvermnent. Attempts were made to adjust t o  these changes. b u w ,  
for example, sent a telegram of congratulation to Sudan nhen it 
gained its mependence; and, as self-governing states came b t a  
being, their co-operation was sought dthou& the Union Government 
made it clear that diplomatic representation could not be effected 
for some the. For, as Louw put it, there were some l o w s t a n d i n g  
conventions in South Africa which could not be changed ever-night . ( 32) 
The G h a n a j a n  Government, at least, seemed t o  tvunderstand" these 
difficulties. (32a) Fmkher, b u w  considered that it would be 
better t o  establish mod relations first and only later M t i a t e  
diplomatic relations - in oMer to avoid the replication of the 
Union Govenzmentt S experience with the b s i a n  mission. (33)  
The ad3uslanent of the Union Government to the changes 
occmrbg in Africa, was not complete. The Union Government still 
t r ied  t o  res i s t  the pressures of decolonization an& looked with 
apprehension at increased U*N. participation in Mrican affairs. (343 
For all the difficulties over the British connection, Strijctom hoped 
that the Central African Fedemtion would become a powerful white 
s ta te  and that the process of abdication would stop further no*. (35) 
Louw hoped the emergent African states would favour the West, and 
warned them against accepting cmmunist aid. (36) It waa hoped that 
the Western colonial powera would mint& their f5nfl~ence1q and that 
"comrmznism" ahould be fo@t +hem in the black world. 
Accordkgly, South Africa under Strijdom (morally) ~upported the 
colonial powers h their own ~ f f i c u l t i e s :  lhnce over Algeria, 
Port& over Goa, and, t o  a lesser extent, -land over Suez. 
With gmwing extermal (and internal) opposition to the 
South African regime - this w a ~  the era of Bandung - the support of 
colonLa1 powers for the Union @st i t s  detractam tended, 
hower ,  to become dilatory. Yet Louw, like Smuts before him, 
continued t o  believe that South Africa had powerful friends who 
would, if the worst came t o  the worst, t h m w  in their weig%t w i t h  
her* (37) 
Strijdom died in 1958 mad his place was taken by M s  
disciple, Dr. H, P. V e m e r d ,  the self-sj;3rled expert on flnative 
affairs". SEr. Verwoesd left ex%emta1 affairs with E r i c  Low until 
the lat ter!  S retirement i n  1963, 
The e a r l y  yews of Verwoerdf S m i n i s t r y  were taken up with 
the Republic and w i t h  hte- opposition to the govemmentts 
policies. Ihcmaehg criticism of South Afrieats internal policies 
and * e  Republican campaig~s,  along with diffeznces over policies 
t o e  Africa, focwsed attention on the doubtful value of 
a p d h e i d  South Africa as a partner to the Western colonial powers 
in Africa. 3ritish-South Atrican relations became strained, with 
difficulties mounting to a cl- in 1960 when Kacmillan warned the 
South African pazliament of the "wind of change". (38) 
The S h q e v i l l e  massacre a f e w  weeks later bought fie 
govemrment of South Africa under considerable criticism f r o m  the 
rest of the world, and especially from African and hian states. 
Whak co-operation there had been between South African and African 
governments came abruptly to a halt and the boycott campaign was 
under ww. (39) The South -can government decided. t o  withdraw 
f r o m  the multi-racial 3ritish Commonwealth in 1961 rather than make 
concessions. Mamillan~s assertion that if the South AfrZcan 
prime minister had been prepared to make concessions rather than 
adhere steadfast ly  t o  dogma elicited from Dr. Vemoerd the 
embittered rejoinder, which c l d f i e d  the conflict of policies: 
"1 see aa a result of his [Mr.  Nacmillan' S] 
policy the white man disappearing from 
Reqya Fn the course of time or be* 
suberged .,. I fear for the position in 
the Cent- A f r i c a  Federation as long as 
this theory of the British kvermment [o f  
making s m a l l  concessions] remains the 
policy f o r  that countqy ... the  policy 
that  Britain is fo l l owing  in Africa does 
not do justice t o  the White man, and 
ultimately wi.11 not be best for the black 
man either.lt (40) 
Dr. Verwoerd explained t-hat he did not obdect t o  Britsint S policy 
w i t h  regad to countries "like Nigeria and Ghanatt, which were  
"undoubtedly wholly Black maflfs countr.iesM and should have become 
free, He wished to do the same 'lfor the native areas of my country 
as it becomes poasibleFq. (41) 
The old question of the Hi& Commission Territories came 
up @. Verwoerd pointed out chat the multi-racial policy was 
being applied +here, Wereas South Africa would have m a d e  those 
territories black mnta countries, 
From 1961 on-, as aL1 the colonial powers except 
Portugal 'abdicated", South Africa would have to fjnd new partners 
in Africa. The ambitious self-conceptions underlying the Africa 
policy were now less in evidence and the task of the policy was 
now less to mtruct imperid powera than to defend and secure the 
acceptability of white South Africa itself in Afrlca. 
Although the hostility of black stakes was aaid to be a 
t r a n s i t o q  feafure of the p o l i t i c d  seene,there was more concern to 
hasten the solution of the domestic native pmblem Wch,  ever since 
Bandung - and increasin&y in the late tfifties and eazly tsixties - 
Afrikaner nationalist intellectuals the-t a necessazy precondition 
of a successful Africa policy, (42) 
Tkie official  reaponbe was t o  hasten the implementat2on d f  
the recommendations of -the Conmission of k q u i r y  into the Secio- 
Economic Development of the Bank  Areas within the Union of South 
Africa ( ~ o m l h s o n  ~ a m i s s i o n )  of 1955. Those mconmae~~dations 
included the provision of a degee of  loca l  self-government in the 
reservea . The creation of these ltself-governingtt units  antus us tans) 
was accounted +he Mposi.t;ivelv side of the t o t a l  apartheid that 
Srerwoerd was  intmducing. (47) 
While South African e s t e r s  m i & t  dismiss the dangers of 
isolation from African govements as containbg no threat o f  real 
ham to white South Africa in the prac t ica l  fitwe, there was 
disqgiet when it seemed that even the Western powers were j o i n i n g  in 
the chorus of execration, altho- the Lat ter  were cautious 80 t o  
"juggle with synonyms1t as nowt to cornit themselves t o  action e n s t  
South Africa, TTerwoed thou&+, that South Africa should be prepared 
t o  accept ideological, isolation: 
"Our strength lies in isolating ourselves 
f r o m  those po l i c i e s  in which we dn not 
believe, and which we believe w i l l  lead 
t o  the disappeamnce of the White man's 
ru le  in South Africa ... But that does 
not mean that  we shall be isolated as a 
state from a11 those other states. (44) 
South Africa had much to offer t o  the West economicdly and 
strategically, it was generally considered, and hdeed even the 
African states would in time become ftmatureR and llrea,listiclf e n o w  
to accept South African co-operation and technical assistance. 
The later Verwoed and B. J. Vorstex 
ltUn temps domin4 paz les considemtiens ma=tgriellesr7 
The w i t h d m w d  of the colonial powers from Africa had two 
complementaq effects of tthich South African goverrrments could not 
wholly disapprove: it removed the oxgaizationaL f~amewoxk f o r  
opposing South A f r i c a  pan-Africdsm, while at the same time it 
removed an apple of discard in the otherwise friendly relations of 
Soukh Africa m d  the West - in prospect, at least, Jus t  as South 
Africa could no longer hope l o  achieve her ends m h l y  by us- -t;ke 
white colonial powers, she could, by the same token, pmceed with 
such of her plans as were atill relevmt d thou t  fear of opposition 
that really mattered, and without jeopasdizing her r e l a t i o n s  wi-bh 
the W t e  Western colonial.  powers, who seemed eager t o  tfappeasetl the 
' lAfro-Asiaulslf .  DP. Verwoerd himself remarked apropos of the Hi& 
C o d s s i o n  Territories: 
'T ssometimes wonder whether our troubles 
are not p a t e r  while Britain remains 
guardian, because, by taking i n t o  
consideration her i n t e r n a t i o d  interests, 
she m y  perhaps act differently from the 
course that  would be followed, by a 
loca l  govement which has only t o  
take its more restricted interests 
into consideration. " (45) 
Bg such considemtiorw Dr. Verwoerd was l e d  to conbmplate 
a multi-racial poli t ical  and economic comonmalth to which even 
p d s  of the disinteg-rating C e n t r a l  African Federation might belong. 
It was as if the wal-pur&smht of-  Sharpeville had turned the 
African C W e r  on its head, a l t k o w  it was only the strategies 
which had markedQ changed, not the a s .  
Dr. Vemerd was t o  reveal that, anticipaking the fai lure 
of the British policy in CentmJ Africa, he had exercised 
considerable restraint by not giving vent to his viem, even though 
the politicians of the Fede'sdtiarz had, taken the liberty t o  SW of 
South Afxica what they pleased, 
"1 d w q e  B O * ~  to .avoid comment 
on what I rewded  as their 
businesa ... 5n orde r  to retain 
their  f r i d s h i p  . 'l (46) 
Vemerd, who had readily collaborate8 with the shod-  
li-ved K a t q  sew (47) , later showed his friendship to an equally 
unpopular regime (in Africa) by violatimg the sactiom imposed on 
Southern, Rhodesia when its a t e  govenvnent declared it, illegaJly, 
independent. South Africa dfismed its neutrality, but it was a 
neutrality which wouZd be credible on ly  to an extreme Grotian and 
one who aJso believed the whi te  Southern Rhodesian cause t o  be 
just. (48) M h e r ,  as an earnest of his comonweaJth designs, he 
met the African Chief Leaha Jonatban of Lesotko in Cape Town. 
It was abut this time that an internal revol t  w j t k h  the National 
Pz-ky  be-, but Verwoerd was s t m k  down by an assassin. Verwoerd 
wm widely seen in Afrlca and elsewhere persordly  to embody a l l  . 
that t o  which the black peoples of t h e  world had for so long, and 
particularly after 1945, objected so much. That image was much 
shaqex among black-people in South Afxica. h the words of his 
biographer: 
flFor South Africa's: African, Coloured 
and kdian population .., Verwoerd 
was an evil genius, a smooth, 
imperturbable, relentless despot, 
hiven by his racist obsessions to 
inf l ic t  endLess cruelties upon tboae 
who were not white." (493 
And yet he was p w t  of a long tradition not deracinated by -the hand 
of a single assassin. 
Verwoerdrs aesassination was merely one of a series of 
violent acts since ShaqevilJe. The most dis thot ive feature of the 
period of -bhe outwad-looking policy is that it is a period in which 
violence, official and unofficial, by Ihe  state and by  it^ crit ics 
has become an intensely preaen't; actuality and contingency in South 
African po l i t i ca l  life, more perhaps than at any other t h e  since 
Shaxpeville. The intensification of violent activity on the part 
of the State f inds its orgmiaationa2 expression in the expamion 
of coercive insti.t;Utions like t k e  police ~pec ia l  branch and the 
amed forces (a leo in the militaq preparation of the A o l e  adult 
white population, and in the increase of the c o e ~ i v e  powers of 
government, symbolized by the 180 Day Act m d  the creation of the 
enigmatic but powexhzl Bureau of State ~ e m i t y ) .  Among the 
opponents of f i e  State in South Africa m d  outside, oxgaxdzations 
for the dolent canduct of political conflict against -the Republic 
have also been fomed, the goveauaent having provided the exordla 
EWEE- 
This tendency, alongside changes in the economic structure 
of South m i c a ,  has brought about chaulges within the white p o l i t y  
the overt expression of which has been the apparent superseseion of 
the cuItma.1-racial solidarity functions of A f r i k m r  a a t i o n d i a t  
i d e o l o a  by a more urgent preoccupation with power (the command of 
resources a d  men f o r  psacticallx described [contLngent] purposes) 
as the do-t dete-t of policy, Pragmatic power-preoccupations 
under Vexwoerd and his successor, B. J. Vorster, have been 
actualized k the p w t h  of the totalist psaffstaat (authoritarian 
state). 
If, then, %he period has been d o h t e a  by material 
considerations, the spiri tual  or cultural aspects of ideology have 
tended t o  'be played d a m  (to the potential material detriment of 
some Afrikaners) . MS, among other things, led  t o  the s p l i t  within 
the ruling national Party. (50 )  
Kost of Voxsterts mipistzy has been marked by the 
vexkrampte revolt, with the result that Vorster haa come to be 
regarded as ffeKLfghtenedn', The result is that t h e  new policy has 
been identified with the ver1igh.g. (51) 
!We fact of the matter, however, is that the ouha.rd- 
looking policy is the respome to isolation. It may have been a 
part of the "enlightenmenttt but it has diffemnt origins a l s o .  (52) 
The reaponse to isolation is t o  clarify and redefine 
policy objectives. The emphasis is now on Southern Africa and the 
strengthening of ties in that area. The ltmul ti-racial commonweaJthf' 
h become an ultimate possibility, but in practice the policy, £ m m  
1965 on-, has amounted t o  support, mate~2d  and moral, f o r  the 
white regimes in southern Africa a~ld CO-ape-tion with black 
governments these, with a few donations here and there. Some 
economic aid has been given to the black s t a t e s  (53)  a d  plans m e  
be* hatched fox an inveabent pm-e that will tie the 
s u m o t m k g  statea to the South African trade, to create, as the 
slogan goes, fleconmic interdependence and political independenceV.(54) 
"Southern African is varioursly defined to include Zmbia aad Congo 
aYld Malagasy, as well as Malawi, Botswana, Lesetho, South West 
Africa, Southern modesia, Angola, Mozambique, and the Republic. 
Apart from investment in +he Cabora Bssa and Kunene projects, and 
the Oxbow scheme, the investment fmm South African public funds 
h been demonstrative (55) while private investment has been 
disjointed rather than consistent with the stated aim of 
v' sys terntic co-operation". (56)  The economic aid t o  Rhodesia has, 
of course, been decisive, wh5Le mil i ta ry  support f a s  the white 
regimes against black guerrillas i s  clearly of the u h o s t  
psychological significance. 
Collaboration in southern Africa, if it succeeded, would 
provide a powerful argument for  other states a l s o  to seek qtdialoguett 
or co-operation with South Africa, while southern African black 
leaders can a lso  act  as South Africa's unofficial  ambassadors in 
Africa, 012 the other hand, Uplomatic successes h o-her parts of 
Africa are intended to encoumge w i l L i n g  (and wavering) southem 
African black governments to accept co-operation. Thus CilliBls 
boastful remask may have more substance to it: 
"1 suggest not very much can be 
accomplished i n  Southern Africa, 
without South Africa ox ~ i n s t  
her  will a d  hteresta ." (57) 
31 the m a q  yens  since the Itwind of changeft speech, 
South Africa's relat ions with WiSah and France seem also to have 
imp~oved. And it now appeam that South Africa at last secure 
Western comaitmeat t o  the fvdefence" of the western Indian Ocean 
which Baamus sought unsuccessfulb as part of  the "defenceft of 
Africa (to which the Simonstown Agreement ~ c o d t t e d ~  ~ritain). 
Should Angle-South African relations continue t o  improve, as w e l l  
as fiance-South African relations,  then perhaps those powers might 
be persuaded to use their influence with the less militant (i .e . 
susceptible to such influence) African states. Surely, it is no mere 
coincidence that the governments most favowable to "dialogue" are 
the ones l e aa t  c r i t i c a l  of the fomer co lon id  powera: Ghana, 
Ivory  Coast, mlagmg, MaLawi, Gabon, Gambia and, arguably, ~ e n y a .  (58) 
The success af the southern Africa policy m i g h t  also 
enable South Africa t o  lvsolvew the disablhg (m far as Africa 
p o l i c i e s  are concerned) t'nativevt o r  tfBanturt pmblem. The refusal 
of the Zntemadional CO& of Justice to adjudicate in the South- 
West Africa cases, too, has given South Africa a chance to start 
llsolvhgll t h i s  problem in South-West Africa as well. (593 It has 
been speculated by advocates o f  the policy that the E& Commission 
Tersitoriea m i & t  be crucial in this regard - fomixg  the basis of 
a territorial.  redistribution of the population of South Africa 
along the l ine suggested by the Tomlhson Report. (60) 
Inter-governmental bar- could also solve, it has been 
asserted, the problem of industrid rights f o r  black workers in 
%hitevT South BfrZza, the black governments assdng the functiolzs 
of trades unions. (61) 
All these specvlations, however, i gno re  the fact that 
there is a war going on between African guerrillas and the white 
regimes of southern Africa, admittedly very small in scale at 
present, but replete with the potentialities of considerable 
complication, Then there a r e  the internal political problems of 
each of the countries of "'Southem Africa" which m y  at any time 
undernine the stabili-ty on which systematic co-operation must 
depend. (62) 
The search f o r  access points in Africa which the outward- 
1 o o k h g  policy entails does lead to self-defeat* adventures as 
well, such as the implication of South Africa h Congo and Nigeria 
on the wrong, i.e. losing, side. There is, indeed, nothing quite 
concLusive in -the art of tempord. government. 
In this paper a n m b e ~  of f o r e i g n  policy and i n t e r m a t i o d  
relations issues closely connected with the development of the 
Africa policy have, for purposes of brevity and c2arpty, been 
omitted, The res t  of South African foreign policy, the United 
Nations campaip @st aparbheid, and international. initiatives 
concerning South West Afrlca have deliberately been Left ou t  of the 
xeckonbg. So a l s o  have de ta i l s  of the Af~ican reaictiom t o  South 
Africa, both in the colonial  ancl in the post-independence periods, 
been merely hinted at rather than elaborated. The aim was simply t o  
s ta te  what South African govements have t r ied t o  achieve h 
Africa, 
In view of all these omissions no detai led theoretical 
fomrulations can be devised f r o m  the foregoing discussion about the 
nature of fore igm policy genesdly or about the place of foreign 
pollcy jn the politics of South Africa i n  particular. Yet certain 
slem-hammer assertions aze incontrovertibly waxranted by the 
foregoing exposition, 
1. The Africa policy was not o n l y  what South African 
pvepnm~nts m k d  Pox themselves (and those to 
whom they were responsive - thei r  constituents) 
in Africa, but reflects also what they considered 
they were entitled t o  in Africa. 
2. Their (apperceived) entitlements related both to a 
role in Africa and t o  certain materid advantages 
thought to flow f r o m  that role. 
3 .  For most of the period under discussion that ro le  
was tho-t to flow both from the relative power 
(command over resources) of South Africa in Africa 
ancl f r o m  the fact that South Africa was a "white" 
state in Africa. 
4. Because it was "wEter%d a llwestern statetr 
the Union, and Later the Republic, expected a 
higher degree of responsiveness towards South 
Africa from key international actors, at leas* 
in-the West, than was accorded. to black atates. 
5. The quest under lblm and Stri jdom (as under 
Sm-ts) f o r  virtual patnership in -he  colonial 
management of f rica (pastiaiLarly south of the 
~ahara) as a preserve for  '!white Western 
civilization1' is clearly closely associated with 
the internal racial policies of South Africa. 
6.  IdentiQing ~5th the West, seeking salidasity 
with the West, were both functions of the racial 
ideology of  South Africa, which i s  primarily a 
colonial ideololgy . (6 3) 
7. Colonialism - i.e. both as the condition of 
relative servitude of blacks and the ascendancy 
of white Europeans in Africa, and as an attitude 
to international organization - was the key and 
necessazy condition f o r  the Africa policy of 
South Africa. 
8.  The passing of the colonid epoch i nAf r i ca ,  
much regretted in South African go~emment 
circles, meant that oolonial self-perceptions 
and the restiltant racial ideologies (of which 
Afxikanes nationalism is sure ly  one in i t s  
racial aspects) were now to be quoted at a 
discount. 
9. In consequence, the emphasis now fell on South 
African roles (self-ascribed) , th0@1 t o  fo l l ow  
f r o m  actual command over resources in Bfrica. 
10. Yet affinity w i t h  the West remained a component 
of  the overall in-bemational p o l i t i c a l  
conceptual struchmes from which "South Africaft 
derived its African roles. 
R a m  these obsemt ions  it.wou3.d seem that the Africa 
policy must be considered under the category of ideology, but 
i d e o l o g  w i t h i n  a definite inter-societal context - the context of 
Western Ehampea~l pre-eminence in the international system and of 
the colonial relationships (now in process of change) which it 
established. 
The Africa policy 1s to be seen as expressive of the 
conflict between the d u e s  and goal-preoccupations of the 
essentially ~ e t t l e r  community of South Africa and the emergent 
values in the international system, of w h i c h  all  major actors in 
Africa have been, since the war, in varying degrees suppo~%ve. 
It is rqy view that the conflict process which ensued can 
be explained as ideological. c o ~ f l i c t  processes (with the help of 
the models of Deutach (64) and B o u l d h g  ( 6 5 )  suitably adapted) 
situated in a specific, histoxtcal, international relations context. 
Notes 
(l) Pan-Africanism is the m e  that South African govermment~ and 
politicians mve to their  policies towazda Africa in the 
period 1945-1960. 
(2) We use the  tern ncoulCext" rather than '%ystemft t o  describe the 
situation of inter-relation which, altho- them is Rome 
C O - o w t i o n ,  there is no framework f o r  the ltauthoritative 
allocation of valuesfm and the inter-terri torial .  or h t e ~  
imperial relationship is too trsub-system dominant1' t o  sat ls fy  
the Modelski-Parsons criferia, f o r  example (cf. Gorge 
Modelski, trAgmria and Ijldustria: Two Models of +he 
International SystemJr in K. Knom: and S. Verba (eds.) The 
Taternational System: Theoretical Essays, Princeton lm, 
p. 12 3) , except perhaps " n a h t e ~ c e  of solidaritgn. 
( 3 )  Ih -he  period 1945-1970 South Africa had five prime ministers, 
d, s h c e  we a m  concerned with policies of governments, we 
hdividua,te the various stages in the development of %he policy 
by the premiership. Incidentally, shifts in the ex tend  
political. situation, as in the Pan-African policy, mughay 
coincided with changes h the premiership. The &ivision is, 
however, mainly f a r  pusrpoees of e ~ o s i t i o n a l  facility. 
(4) Union of South Africa, Pasliamentary Debates, Rouse of Assembly (hereafter Ass, ~eb.1, 1945, Vol. 52, Col. 3719. 
(5)  W. K. Ha;ncock: Smuts 2: The Fields  of Force 1910-1950, 
Cambridge, 1968, pp. 408-410; N. Manser&: Documents and 
Speeches on Bri t i sh  Commonwealth Affairs 1931-1952, London, 
1953, PP* 574-5754 
(6) G. W: :, 
Oxford, 1970, p.  29; L. H. Gafln and M. Gelfand: EIu~ins of 
Rhodesia, London, 1964, pp. 59-62; HaJlcock, op. ci-t . ,  p.  151. 
(7) cf, C. Palley: The Constitutional History and Law of Sou&em 
Rhodesia 2888-1965, Oxford,  1966, p,  322. 
( 8 )  British goverrrments have from. time to time ~hown themselves 
to be insensitive to Africans! ri#ats: as Chamberlain did 
when he thought ts buy off Eitler with concessions in Africa 
(see L. S. h r y :  W Political. Life, Vol. 111: Phe 
Unforgiving Years, London, pp. 247-248). Tlrre creation of the 
Central Africa Federation in the teeth of resolute African 
opposition is a lso  a case in point. The literature on this 
is extensive; some of it is cited inPalley, op. cit., loc. 
e i t  fn. 2, 4 9  
( 9 )  D i e  TransvaJer, 22 November 1944; Die Burmr, II A u g u s t  
1943; D i e  Transvaler, 8 May 1943. 
(10) Rhodesia Heralc, 7 May 1943. 
(11) cf. Z. Ngavirue: !Be Gel3nan Section versus the Union Section 
in South West Africa 1920-19391m 
(12) hti-communism may have encouraged him to co-operate with the 
Commonwealth: Round Table, March 1949, p ,  186. Besides, it 
pleased wlish-speaking supporters (and potential supporters) 
in South Africa. 
(13) D. F. Man: Wat ons het, Hou ons, Cape Tom, 1924(?), pp. 
7-8 
(14) Pre tor ia  News, 13 December 1951. 
(15) The Foreim Policy of the Union of South Africa: Statements 
by the Hon. D. F. l K t a ~ 1 ,  etc., Government Printer, Pretor ia ,  
a d  Ass, Deb, 1945, To1 . 52, Cols. 3946-3948. 
(1.6) E. A.  Walker: A History of Southern Africa, London, 1957,  
p.  825; D i e  Burger, 24 February 1951; Kees-ts Contemporazy 
&chives, 11438A, 8516C, 100238, 9448A. 
(17) ASS. Deb. 1954, Vol. 84, Col. 4496 . See a lso  1951, Vol .  75, 
COLS. 6818-6821. 
(18) See fn. 15 above. 
(21) Jn 1946 a South African Export Trade Goodwill MLssion had 
visited the Ehodesias, Belg5an Congo, Brazzaville, Uganda, 
Kenya, T m g a m y i h ,  Zanzibar, and N ~ a l a n d .  "The conception 
of a trade goodwill mission to the  Northern Territories was 
due to the initiative and enkespxise of the Hon. S. F. Waterson, 
W s t e r  of Economic Development [in Smuts 1 cabinet] . The 
South African Federated Chamber of Tndustriea ... readily 
spomored the mission." S.A.P.C.I., South African Ekport 
Txad~ Goodwill Kission 1946. Main Report (~oneoed) , p.  1. 
(22) 011 mxkets in Africa, cf., e.g., D i e  Burmr, 11 A w t  1943, 
and E. H. Louwfs speeches in the Belgian Conga, repoded in 
Pretoria New, 30 A w t  1949. 
(23) 195& howevez, the idea of a Pan-African Organ5zation was 
thought -sous as it waa considered $ha+ difficulties 
simjlaz t a  those experienced at IJ.N.0. m i & t  arise. 
(24) Crnd. 9520 (1955): Ikchanges of ktt, =rs on Defence Matters 
be-kween the Governments of the United IGngdom and the Union 
of South Africa, June 1955. 
(25) Pretoria  News, 30 A u g w t  1949. 
(27) See KmC*A,, 114588, 
(28) cf. Round Table, June 1949, pp. 205-6. 
(293 French initials for Conmission for Technical Co-operation in 
Africa South of the Sahara, C o d a s i o n  for Scientific 
Co-operation, etc., Fund f o r  Mutual. Assistance in Africa, etc. 
(30) Df e Buger, L1 October 1945. See also Letter by 
Dr. A .  H. Jonker. 
(31) ASS, Deb. 1955, Vol. 87, Cols. 5072-5075. Prelinhary t o  the 
reopening of the a s s i o n  the Governor-General visited 
Madagascax in 1955. Pretoria News, 22 June 1955, 26 July 
1955. 
(32) ASS. Deb, 1958, V o l .  97, Cols, 2371-2372, See a l s o  Vol. 100, 
Col. 5527. 
(32a) Ibid. 
3 Ibid., and E. H. Eouw: trThe Union and t he  l3nergm-k Statesvf 
in South Africa in the African Continent, South Afxicaa 
Bureau of Racial Affairs (sABRA), 1959, p.  19 e t  seq. On 
Louw and the Rusaian consulate, see Pretor ia  News, 3 March 
19 49 
(34) b u w  thowf UNEXSA was tbusclhg i n v h n  the work of C.C.T.A. 
BSs. Deb., Col. 2443. 
(35) Die Wmr,  I1 October 1955. cf, D8nges in D i e  Bmger, 
3 October 1955. 
(36) huw: tlThe Union and the Elnergent Statestt h S-, op. c i t . ,  
p.  19 e t  passim, 
(37) Vol. 100, Col, 5520. 
(38) Welensw writes that  when Butler oisited Rhodesia in 1958 he 
meant to go to South Africa to give a similaz speech but was 
prevented by the death of Strijdom. See S i r  Boy Welemlgr: 
4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia 
,and Nyasaland, London, 1964, p.  101. For m interestiag 
treatment o f  the  &cmi.llan visit, see the high2.y tendentious 
account in F, B a r n a d :  13 Years w i t h  D r .  VerwoeM, 
Voo-strekkerpers, Johannesburg, 1967, pp. 59-70. 
( 3 9 )  See K.C .A. , 175763, 17528A. 
(40) Ass. Deb, 1961, Vol. 107, Col. 3507. 
(41) Ibid. 
(42) cf. , e .g. , Die Burmr, 23 April 1957 
(43) Compare Die Burger 28 January 1959. 
(44) $ss. Deb. (~epublic Series), Vol. 3, Cols, 3761-3762. 
(453 Ass. Deb., Vol. 6, Col. 4599. 
(46) Ibid. See also J. E. Spence: The Republic Under Pressure, 
o.u.P., 1965. 
(47) See, e.g. ,  C. C. OIBrien: To ICatawa an& Back, London, 
1962, PP = 193 and 197. 
(48) Cf. Hedley BuJ.3.: tlThe Gmtian Conception of lb temat ional  
Socie-t;yIt in H. Butterfield and M. W i & t  (eds. ) Diplomatic 
Lnvestimtians: Essws in the meow of International 
Pol i t i c s ,  London, 1966. 
(49) Alexander Hepple: Vemerd ,  Bazmondsworth, 1967, p 238. 
(50) O n  the %nli&tementm see also S, C .  EJolutshungu: lvIssues 
of the Afrikaner rEhli&tenmentt'f in African Affairs, 
1971. 
(51) cf. Anthony Delius : l t lntemational Argument and E k t e d  
Policy in South Africatf in African Affairs, October 1970. 
The fact of the matter is, however, that  decoloniza-bion Left 
South Africa with the choice between isolation and an o u M -  
loakhg- policy, and in the H.C.Ts. and Southern Rhodesia 
pmvided o p p o r t d t i e s  f o r  such a policy. cf. 
G. S. hbas chagte : Suid-AfrW en Af rika : Die Staatkundlge 
Verhotdixx in die mdperk 1945-1966, Potchefstmom, 1969~ 
(52) Ibid. 
(53) E. M. Rhoodie, The Third Africa, Cape Town, 1969, pp. 145-185. 
(543 Ibid.,and S. A. hrn-, J. J. Stadler md P. 3. van der 
Merwe: The Concept of Economic Co-operation in Southern 
Africa, Pretor ia ,  1968. 
(55) cf. R. Molten~: Africa and South Africa: The hrplicationa 
of South Africa" out& looking policy, London,Z971, esp. 
pp. 9-10. 
(56) Ibid. 
(57) Report fmm South Afxlca, Jmuasg 1970 . 
(58) For an hteresting discussion of this topic ,  see: The Eewn 
Observer, 1-14 January 1971. 
(59)  It has been suggested that t h e  Odendaal Commissionrs 
recommendations would have been implemented earlier but f o r  
the fear that the 1.6.5. m i g h t ,  while the matter w a s  & 
Judice, have iseued an injunction, the enforcement of which 
the U.K. and the G.S. would have been unable to resist, It is 
doubtful, however, whether the South African Gmesnment would 
have accepted an adverse judgement on the substantive issues 
of the South West Africa cases. 
(60) U.G. 61/1955, para. 14 et sea. See B. Dale: Bot~lwarna and 
i ts  Southern Nei&bour, Ohio, 1970. 
(61) Lombard et al. , op . cit . , p.  45. 
(62) I have d e d t  wikh these matters in a paper f gave to the Africa 
Society of the Dniversify of Keele in November 1970, on 
"The P ~ l i t i c a l  Context of Economic Co-operation h Southern 
and Central Africatv. 
(63) cf. David E. Apter on 'Ideology and Discontentm in Apter (ed. ) 
Ideology and Discontent, esp. pp. 18-21,and R. A-. Scdapino, 
" ' I d e o l o ~  and Modernisation - the Japanese Casev1 in  Apter, 
op. cit., pp. 93-127, on the a o l i d a z i Q  and identity aapects 
of ideolom. 
(64) Deutschl s conmuxication model, but especially Chapter 19 
"The Self Cloame of PolitfcaJ. Systemsvv (read with Bedding 
[see below] ) . K. W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government, New 
Y O X ~ ,  1966, 
(65)  K. E. Bauldlng: Conflict andl Defence: A General Theory, 
New York, 1943, pp. 277-304. 
